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Racial oppression, like ethnicity itself, is "about the power to name others"1 and the 
power to name the self. But it is also much more. Striving to reorganize ethnic groups 
into discrete, independent, mutually-exclusive entities with simple, enduring 
characteristics, racial oppression locates the source of social problems in the 
breaching of the boundaries it has posited and the resulting "contamination", 
"confusion", "releases of primordial violence", "loss of identity", "cultural 
homogenization", "disorder", "inefficiency" or "environmental degradation". The way 
is then open for a dualistic, bureaucratic response to ethnic difference: either 
assimilation on the one hand or, on the other, exclusion in one of its multiple forms: 
segregation, resettlement, repatriation, dispossession, eviction, ethnic immigration 
controls, repression or extermination.  
In an environmental variant of racial oppression, certain cultures are sealed off not 
just from others but also from a "Nature" similarly conceptualized as Other. Here it is 
ecological discipline, or the identities of trees, wolves or watersheds, which are held 
to be threatened by the breaching of the imagined frontier, in this case a 
Human/Nature boundary. The racist double bind applies in this case as well. Certain 
ethnic groups must either be physically separated from the imagined "Nature" by 
other groups who have unilaterally decided what that "Nature" is, or submit to being 
identified as One with it, as savages, noble or otherwise.2  
Racial oppression works to ensure that stories of ethnic contamination and 
purification eclipse other stories about history, power and social relations. Yet the 
anti-democratic attempt to impose single, rigid ethnic grids on so many social 
activities is, ultimately, an impossible job, even where the required ethnic boundaries 
can be physically marked on society (through identity cards, for instance) or on the 
land. Where states or warlords try to draw territorial boundaries around ethnic groups, 
they may run up against the obstacle that certain ethnicities remain stubbornly centred 
rather than bordered, organized around jural, economic or cultural relationships rather 
than location or landscape, or interpenetrating rather than located geographically.3 
Where attempts are made to lump together different groups, the groups may respond 
by drawing distinctions among themselves. Where, conversely, attempts are made to 
emphasize fine ethnological distinctions among groups, new, umbrella ethnicities may 
emerge to counteract the perceived "divide and rule" strategy.  
Unilateral attempts to impose ethnic definitions even of one's own group may be 
challenged, as when Westerners decrying the inroads of "Western culture" into 
"unspoiled" rural societies in Asia or Africa find members of those societies 
contesting whether Westerners have the unilateral right to decide what counts as 
"Western" or "unspoiled". Similarly, evictees from national parks may ask what gives 
certain scientists, wildlife conservationists, forestry bureaucrats or Deep Ecologists 
the unilateral authority to decide what that "Nature" is from which certain types of 
human influence must be barred, pointing out that forests (to take one example) may 
also be defined in ways which do not revolve around the idea of "purifying" them by 
excluding or naturalizing their human co-creators.  
Challenges may also be mounted to attempts to halt inquiry into the causes of social 
problems at the "ethnic" level of explanation. Los Angeles or London police who cite 
arrest statistics as evidence that blacks are more criminally inclined than whites will 
inevitably be confronted by anti-racists insisting that the same statistics are evidence 
of institutionalized discrimination. Pundits attempting to explain anti-Irish racism in 
England by axiomatizing cultural differences will be contradicted by historians who 
point out the political advantages to colonizing groups of "reducing all members of an 
oppressed group to one undifferentiated social status, a status beneath that of any 
member of any social class within the colonizing population".4 Meanwhile, attempts 
to associate particular ethnic groups with a limited set of unexplained attributes will 
be attacked as stereotyping.  
Partly because of this irrepressible flux of contributions and counter-contributions to 
the project of ethnic definition, the work of racial oppression is never done. Fresh 
resources must constantly be found and mined to shore up each new attempt to exert 
unilateral control over processes of ethnic definition as they begin to crumble, and 
new means devised to block democratic probing of the foundations of the walls 
erected either between ethnic groups or between certain ethnic groups and "Nature". 
Nearly any sort of material may be called into service, depending on availability and 
circumstances: phenotypical differences; visible differences of religion, agricultural 
practices, gender relations or government; latent prejudices, associations and 
stereotypes; facts, statistics and theories from biology, history, agronomy, medicine, 
hydrology, phrenology, forestry, archaeology and anthropology; environmentalism; 
the discourses of "rights", "identity", "fairness", "equality" and "local autonomy"; as 
well as nationalisms, liberalisms and globalisms of various kinds.  
Hence the mobile, heterogeneous quality of racial oppression, which can never be 
reduced to any one set of biological claims, cultural theories, statistical concepts, 
individual feelings, or even essentialist ideas. Racism is neither a theory nor a 
collection of beliefs, sentiments or intentions; to say so is analogous to confusing 
symptom with disease. Rather, it is a strategy and a process of social control which 
functions to block inquiry and the attempt to live with difference, in which theory, 
science and mental states play a derivative part. To assume that rejecting or abjuring 
these beliefs or sentiments is by itself an adequate response to racism is likely only to 
strengthen it.  
A Case of Ethnicized Conflict 
One prominent world terrain of racial oppression stretches between the lowlands and 
highlands of South-East Asia, where valley-based states have regularly attempted to 
sedentarize or repress hill-dwelling ethnic minorities. Recently, racist patterns and 
processes in the region have been sustained and strengthened through the activities of 
international environmentalists and developmentalists. In a scheme which would 
affect 60 million people in China, Laos, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, 
for example, the Asian Development Bank has proposed to "reduce the population of 
people in mountainous areas and bring them to normal life".5 In Thailand, more than 
half a million hill dwellers scapegoated for deforestation have faced official 
resettlement threats for decades, with the theories of international agencies such as the 
Food and Agriculture Organization about the destructiveness of swidden agriculture 
often providing backup.6  
The potential for racial violence in the region is exemplified by a current conflict over 
water and forests in Chom Thong, a district of 1736 square kilometres in Chiang Mai 
province of Northern Thailand encompassing some 106 villages, half lowland, half 
upland or highland. Here, over the past decade, elite conservationists, state 
bureaucracies and politicians have helped each other exploit, rework and augment a 
legacy of highland-lowland ethnic tensions in the course of pressing for resettlement 
of mountain communities on "environmental" grounds and for greater elite and state 
control over mountain resources. On 22 March 1998, a lowland "green" group 
advocating relocation of highlanders as a way of solving water shortages, 
accompanied by National Park officials, invaded a mountain village, tore down 
pavilions sheltering Buddha images, and removed two images.7 In April, May and 
June, roads leading to the highlands were blocked by lowlanders demanding 
immediate removal of highland dwellers, causing considerable hardship in the hills, 
with the offenders enjoying immunity from police action.8 On 24 June, a group of 
lowlanders including the chief of Doi Inthanon National Park ascended to a royal 
development project in the hills and attempted to destroy agricultural pipes and 
canals.9 Amid a well-orchestrated atmosphere of anti-highlander emotion, the Thai 
cabinet resolved in June to relocate highland communities living in ecologically 
"sensitive" areas, reversing the previous government's undertaking to respect the land 
rights of communities established before protected areas were gazetted and to explore 
environmental solutions which would allow many mountain communities to remain in 
national parks and wildlife sanctuaries.10  
Economic and ecological changes have provided the opportunity, and international 
environmentalism much of the ammunition, for this reshaping of ethnic conflict. Until 
fairly recently, highland and lowland economies in many regions of North Thailand, 
including Chom Thong, were linked in ways which reproduced ethnicity and a certain 
degree of ethnic tension, but which also militated against extreme ethnic violence. For 
example, lowlanders and highlanders cooperated for mutual benefit in the opium 
business. Traders acting for the state Opium Monopoly (set up in 1852 following 
British prodding) profited from official promotion of domestic poppy cultivation in 
the hills after 1947.11 Lowlanders took part in cultivation, harvest, trade, and 
provision of fertilisers and pesticides, while highlanders of several ethnic groups were 
attracted to poppy-growing as a way of fostering egalitarianism and independence.12 
Karen hill-dwellers, to take another example, contracted to raise lowlanders' cattle and 
buffaloes in return for calves, with periodic friendly visits between the two parties 
enlivened by common hunting and gathering expeditions.13  
Symbiotic lowland-highland trade relations have also been important, and officials' 
sense that highlanders' ethnicity can be marketed as a tourist commodity may have 
moderated pressures to concentrate them in reservations.14 On a more general cultural 
level, lowland and state demands that languages and ethnic categories be arranged in a 
hierarchy privileging Central Thai and lowland urban cultural norms have been 
partially accommodated within a system in which multiple, overlapping, unbordered 
ethnic identities are possible, and in which reducing "divisiveness of language 
difference" is not felt to entail extinguishing non-Tai languages.15 Speaking Karen, 
Northern Thai and "Standard" (Central) Thai in the space of a few minutes on an 
urban street, or being Karen in behaviour in one context and Northern Thai in another, 
have not ordinarily been regarded, particularly by those on the lower end of the 
hierarchy, as signs of either deception, identity confusion or "hybridity".16  
Such modes of coexistence have nonetheless been accompanied by longstanding 
patterns of oppression and insult whose impact has often been underestimated by even 
the most sympathetic members of dominant lowland ethnic groups.17 As lowland 
farmers, developers and bureaucrats alike have encroached into the hills with mining, 
logging, resort and other projects, state agencies' insistence on hierarchy and a 
superior position within it have been exacerbated by official attempts to recast ethnic 
identity, religion and language as sharply bounded, either/or categories.  
The elision of Thai ethnicity and Thai nationality -- a process exemplified in the 
transformation of Siam into "Thai-land" in 1939 and in the way Thai-ness continues 
to be constructed partly in opposition to the image of various ethnically non-Thai 
"Others Within"18 -- has also disadvantaged mountain peoples. On the legal level, 
even some long-term mountain residents of Thailand have had much more difficulty 
than other groups in attaining citizenship and land rights. Mountain minorities are also 
routinely tagged by lowlanders with a number of negative stereotypes, including 
dirtiness,19 primitiveness, and "free sex", a portmanteau category of immorality which 
includes promiscuity and prostitution in addition to the perceived licence accorded to 
young courting couples among some highland groups.20  
Recent Patterns of Scapegoating 
For several decades, in the course of their work in staking claims to contested 
resources, battling insurgency, responding to the concerns of other countries, 
centralizing administrative control and fortifying their image as problem-solvers in 
the hills of Northern Thailand, state agencies have been attempting to draw new 
territorial boundaries on the land and new ethnic boundaries on the body of society. 
These boundaries have the effect of scapegoating mountain minorities for a variety of 
ills. Placing the neologism chao khao (which translates as either "hilltribes" or "them 
people") in a punning, rhyming binary opposition with chao rao ("us people"), 
officials have often managed to stifle discussion of the deeper causes of social 
problems.21  
For example, after official authorization for opium commerce was withdrawn in 1958 
under international pressure, blame for the new "opium problem" was often attached 
to highland minorities, whose newfound innate "cultural affinity" for the crop became 
a focus of solemn analysis even by officials and non-minorities profiting directly from 
the drug trade.22 The fact that many highland minority communities, particularly 
Hmong, joined, or were pushed by government persecution into, the ill-fated 
movement of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the 1960s and 1970s added 
new edge to official stereotypes of mountain dwellers as outlaws. At the same time, a 
number of Hmong communities who had supported the government side and been 
persuaded to act as bulwarks against the CPT by settling and farming alongside new 
strategic roads punched into the forest were accused of forest encroachment and 
dispossessed as soon as the Communist movement collapsed in 1982.23  
Later, responsibility for resource conflicts which were partly the result of extensive 
state-sanctioned commercial deforestation -- the Royal Forest Department leased 
approximately half Thailand's land area to commercial logging concessionaires 
between 1969 and 1979 alone -- was attributed to "hilltribes", the group least able to 
defend itself against the charge. Here the Thai state drew strength from longstanding 
official international biases against swidden cultivation, mobile populations and 
highlanders' forestry practices. During the 1980s, for example, although mountain 
minorities' activities were the proximate cause of perhaps five per cent of annual 
deforestation, and were restricted to the northern and western parts of the country, 
they were regularly named by officials and technocrats as the primary cause of the 
entire country's deforestation problem.24 In Chom Thong, such practices of blame 
helped gloss over a history of state-promoted teak logging by British companies from 
the 1930s as well as extraction of hardwoods for tobacco curing and timber from the 
1940s through the 1970s.25  
National Park Ideology 
The establishment by Thai elites, under the tutelage of US and other international 
conservationists, of parks and wildlife reserves helped to entrench further this crude 
ethnic grid. A simplified people-vs.-trees narrative of forest decline was superimposed 
on the realities of forest history, making it possible to reinterpret the character and 
persistence of highland forests as a result of the relative absence of human influence 
rather than of human stewardship or commercial inaccessibility. In an irony often 
noted by minority observers, the disproportionate survival of good forest in minority-
occupied areas was transformed into a reason for evicting minorities.  
In line with this narrative, land was dichotomized into permanent agricultural fields 
and forests in which no agriculture was supposed to be practised. No room was left 
for intermediate or temporary forms such as forest fallows. All types of swidden 
agricultural systems were lumped together, stigmatized as irrational, destructive rai 
luean loy (literally, "drifting" dryland agriculture) and claimed to be the invention and 
property of an abstract group called "hill tribes".26 In 1986, one forestry official even 
went so far as to justify relocation of minority highlanders by saying that the "Hmong 
entered Thailand deliberately to destroy the forest and ethnic Thai practice slash-and-
burn agriculture only because of the example of the hill tribes".27  
The practice of some upland or highland inhabitants such as certain Karen 
communities of themselves keeping some areas permanently off limits to cultivation 
was rendered largely invisible. Admitting the existence of such areas would have 
meant acknowledging the possibility of limiting the role of the state in forest 
protection; and because such areas were usually unposted, unfenced, and governed 
through orally-transmitted rules rather than official written documents, they tended in 
any case to be "unreadable" by office-based officials.  
As minority-defined agriculture became outlaw, minority-defined forests, as 
community spaces, were legislated into eclipse. The landscape itself was redefined in 
a way which made it possible to join up both sides of the classic racist double bind. 
Exclusion from the forests, which were to be regarded as empty, non-human spaces, 
became one with assimilation in the form of adoption of permanent agriculture. A 
system of ethnic and class exclusion became the default position for highland forest 
"conservation". Forests devoid of field systems or visible community stewardship 
became aesthetically-valuable exhibits symbolizing control, hierarchy, and ecological 
value to agency chiefs (jao naai)28 and city-based conservationists alike. The fact that 
such approaches to conservation are increasingly recognized internationally as 
scientifically obsolete29 has had limited impact in this political context. In Chom 
Thong, where Doi Inthanon National Park, established in 1972, now encloses over 
three dozen villages, and Ob Luang National Park, gazetted in 1991, encroaches on 
still more, expansion of state territorial control through national park management, 
besides criminalizing cultivation on fallow lands, use of forest commons, and 
unregistered land use, has entailed uncertainty, harassment and threats for highland 
minorities.  
In addition to violating the new "non-human" space of the forest, swidden systems 
have also been seen as disorderly, un-Tai pursuits. They are thus subject to moral and 
legal strictures from which other, often more invasive activities practised by 
lowlanders -- mining, construction of dams, roads, tourist resorts, and plantations, all 
regarded as disciplined "development" activities -- are often exempt. In fact, at the 
same time that the protected area system redefined the use and management of 
highlands by underprivileged non-Tai groups as a conservation problem, it left 
unmarked or invisible many of the uses of the same areas by dominant ethnic groups 
and classes. Today, forests worked over by state officials, middle-class 
conservationists, tourists, plantation workers, scientific researchers, road-builders, 
royal palace personnel and so forth, and influenced by the distinctive fire and erosion 
regimes they introduce, are frequently characterized as "undisturbed" or "restored", 
whereas forests under the fire and agricultural stewardship of highland farmers are 
viewed as "degraded" or "endangered" by definition. When large fires broke out in 
Doi Inthanon National Park during March 1998, for example, it was immediately 
reported in Thai newspapers and by some government officials that the culprits were 
highland minority communities. Subsequent investigation revealed that this was a 
reflex reaction,30 the fires having been battled day after day by some of the very 
minority villagers accused of setting them.31  
In another move which uses a scientific justification for claiming the highlands for the 
exclusive use of a particular ethnic group, areas occupied by non-Tai ethnic groups 
have also became prime targets for "watershed protection". In the mid-1980s, the 
National Watershed Classification applied special 1A protected status to many 
highland areas. This move again had the effect of both criminalizing highland 
agriculture and implicitly licensing, ex post facto, the exploitation of now-degraded or 
already-converted lowland forests, which have been categorized as having few 
hydrological functions and cast in the role of a "naturally" suitable substrate for 
agriculture.32 The simplified forest/human dichotomy of national park and 
"watershed" ideology has thus tended to mystify different historical patterns of forest 
clearance in highlands and lowlands.  
Violence and Its Conditions 
Physical violence against mountain minorities, much of it unreported, has been an 
integral part of their increased stigmatization and scapegoating. The violence is 
directed, again following the standard racist dualism, at either removal or 
assimilation. In February 1986, for example, a programme to relocate "hill tribes" in 
six provinces in Northern Thailand was launched by the Third Army Command, the 
Ranger Command, the Border Patrol Police, the Suppression Division and the Royal 
Forestry Department under the banner of suppressing forest destruction, shifting 
cultivation and opium growing.33 "Hill tribes" were portrayed on radio and TV and in 
newspapers as "wicked" and as a threat to the country. As the commander of the Third 
Army sternly put it, "those who destroy the nation are not the ones who illegally cut 
down 20 or 30 trees, but the hill tribes". The Deputy Director-General of the Royal 
Forestry Department opined that the solution to the "hilltribe problem" was to 
"sterilize them by force so that they cannot increase their numbers any further".34  
In September 1987, Thai troops rounded up hundreds of Akha from 13 villages and 
sent them across the border to Burma, burning houses and killing livestock to prevent 
their return. Many had long legally resided within Thailand's borders.35 In 1994, eight 
Ho Chinese, Lisu, Mien and Lahu communities were forcibly evicted from Doi Luang 
National Park and settled on forest reserve land in Lampang.36 In March 1998, as part 
of his efforts to make a quick reputation as a forest-fire-fighter, Deputy Agriculture 
Minister Newin Chidchob ordered a summary, semi-random roundup of 56 Paluang 
and other people on arson charges. (He was later embarrassed when it was pointed out 
that the two square kilometres of fires they had been charged with starting had 
occurred alongside an unauthorized forest road used for transporting illegal logs and 
built by associates of Newin's father-in-law, who is involved in rock-blasting in the 
area.)37 A few days later, forestry officials allegedly threatened to burn down a nearby 
village if its residents did not move out within three days, and in May destroyed 
mango trees and torched farm shelters in another settlement. The previous year, 
Border Police patrols had shaved villagers' heads at a Karen settlement in a protected 
area in western Thailand and forced children to wear school uniforms.38  
The ground for recent ethnic violence in Chom Thong in particular has been prepared 
both by an unravelling of economic, political and cultural relationships between 
highlands and lowlands and by more extensive resource use in both lowlands and 
highlands. Efforts to break up the opium economy, for example, have cut one 
economic link between highland and lowland interests, with foreign, multilateral and 
national anti-drug funds being poured not only into Thai military operations but also 
into crop-substitution programmes introducing cabbages, fruit trees and other cash 
crops to highlanders. For instance, the Thai-Norwegian Church Aid Highland 
Development Project has promoted commercial, chemical-intensive monocultures of 
cabbages among local Hmong villages.  
Many lowlanders, meanwhile, have participated in independent commercialization 
processes, turning rice fields and degraded forest areas into longan orchards, soybean 
plots and pig farms, and producing charcoal from remaining forested areas. With 
official backing, lowland cultivation has expanded to the base of the hills and 
beyond.39 Both patterns of commercialization have had far-reaching unintended 
consequences. Pushing highlanders into cash cropping has meant neglecting the 
potential for building on other, better-established patterns of agriculture, has 
contaminated streams with chemicals, and is perceived by many conservationists as 
having resulted in increased forest clearance.40 Meanwhile, with a quadrupling of 
lowland double-cropping within the last quarter-century, and the spread of 
commercial longan orchards, water consumption in the lowlands has multiplied 
many-fold, particularly in the dry season.41 When water supplies are squeezed during 
a drought, as during 1998, and politicians seeking lowlanders' votes join officials in 
scapegoating highland minorities,42 the stage is set for intractable highland-lowland 
strife. Tentative efforts dating from the early 1990s by highland minorities and 
traditional lowland irrigation groups to work out new agreements over water use have 
not been enough to mend the ruptured connections.  
The Role of Conservationists 
The unusual degree of racialization of resource conflict in Chom Thong is due partly 
to the work of conservationist organizations. Particularly prominent is the 
Dhammanaat Foundation. Set up in the mid-1980s by a charismatic Buddhist abbot, 
phra ajaan Pongsak Techadhammo, and granted a hill concession by the Royal Forest 
Department, Dhammanaat, in addition to its plantation and fire-prevention activities, 
has vigorously campaigned for an "urgent termination of settlement" in what it calls 
"upper watershed" or "headwater" forests. The foundation argues, plausibly, that it is 
reasonable to assume, given the special soil and other characteristics of these forests, 
that they act as a giant "sponge" holding and slowly releasing water to the rivers 
below. Several conclusions are then drawn from this assumption: first, that 
exploitation of these forests is what explains recent lowland water shortages; second, 
that these forests ensure the "survival of everyone in the nation";43 and third, that it 
follows that agriculture must cease there. Dhammanaat is particularly incensed by the 
highland forest destruction and agricultural water use it sees as associated with 
commercial cabbage-growing promoted by foreign and national agencies, and the 
drying up of streams which it regards as the result. The foundation itself has made 
efforts to secure a resettlement site for the Hmong communities it wishes to be 
"voluntarily" relocated -- a site which, it asserts, will not be subject to the failures 
which have dogged other resettlement efforts.44  
Currently led by mom rachawong Smansanid Svasti, a minor member of the Thai 
royal family, Dhammanaat has a number of powerful allies. Forestry department 
personnel and military officers alike have responded enthusiastically to an approach 
stressing the importance of official control of well-marked conservation territories.45 
In the highlands, Dhammanaat personnel have been seen to cooperate closely with 
armed military Rangers, Third Army personnel and Forest Department officers.46 
Many urban-based middle-class nature lovers are meanwhile attracted to this 
particular conservationist banner by a vision of a strictly-bounded, modernized, non-
human, Buddhist-sanctioned, contemplatable "nature" under secure hierarchical state 
(i.e., lowland) management and out of the control of "primitive" tribes,47 while some 
UN agencies, foreign government bodies and foreign environmental NGOs applaud 
Dhammanaat as an exemplar of indigenous environmentalism.48  
Dhammanaat's simple message also appeals to many ordinary lowlanders who are not 
only suffering water shortages and economic hardship at a time of financial crisis, but 
are also finding it harder to maintain their social status as "more developed" than 
highland minorities, and are receptive to strategies which might make their 
membership in the dominant ethnic group count for more. One Dhammanaat activity, 
critics charge, is inciting mob violence by both lowland villagers and state officials.49 
Members of the Chom Thong Headwater Forest and Environment Conservation Club, 
for example, an organization closely advised by Dhammanaat, not only organized 
roadblocks and the March 1998 Buddha-image confiscation but also a demonstration 
on 21 April in which Chiang Mai University anthropologists supportive of indigenous 
rights were burned in effigy and accused of lying about deforestation.50  
In July 1997, a Bangkok journalist, in a series of inflammatory newspaper articles, 
wrote revealingly of the logic of resentment which makes Hmong highlanders a 
special "target of animosity from the lowlands":51  
"[I]t is not just because the ... Hmongs clear watershed forest areas for cultivation ... 
It's probably because the Hmongs are getting richer than the lowland farmers. 
Traditionally, the lowland farmers have looked down on the minority tribes. Now, the 
tables are turned ... In Baan Paa Kluay, [Hmong villagers] buy pickup trucks,52 
deposit cash in banks and buy longan orchards... the formerly migrant minorities are 
building an increasing number of permanent houses ... The money comes from the 
sale of cabbages and flowers.  
"Dr Suchira Prayoonpitak [a Dhammanaat spokesperson and Payap University 
sociologist] explained how the highland farmers have increased their needs for 
material goods. Highlanders used to farm for self-support. Now, they're into 
commercial farming, she explained ... 'They change their farming methods to increase 
their earnings, without considering possibly negative repercussions on the 
environment and on human health.' Local sales of electrical appliances, farm 
equipment, personal luxuries and modern conveniences have been slowly but steadily 
increasing, as seen in their houses ... Dr Suchira said over 130 Hmong families of 
nearly 800 members are presently living in Chom Thong district. 'They have damaged 
four to five streams and rivers that feed lowland farms,' she said."  
The Dhammanaat spokesperson goes on to allege a pattern of systematic deceit in 
highland minorities' activities:  
"'[Hilltribes] use various tactics to exploit watershed forests without being punished,' 
[Dr Suchira] said ... The villagers avoid cutting down trees, as the tell-tale evidence of 
such an activity is too difficult to hide. 'For instance, they remove the bark of a tree 
and leave it to die,' she said. They cut down the dead tree the following year when it 
burns more easily. Others encroach fertile watershed forests from behind the trails or 
observation points of national forest reserves, national parks and wildlife sanctuaries."  
The journalist then adds this extraordinarily prejudicial coda:  
"While the highlanders continue to consider the mountain slopes their private 
fiefdom, shrugging off lowland rules and regulations, they only have stubbornness 
and inaccessibility on their side. The authorities are lowlanders, so the lowland 
farmers have an edge in this battle of wills ... Will the highlanders meekly go to 
relocation areas? Will the natural balance be restored soon enough for the lowlanders 
to be happy? Or will there be war?"  
It is difficult to judge from such passages whether it is the breaching of supposed 
ecological limits or the breaching of the boundaries of what is considered suitable 
behaviour for particular ethnic groups that arouses the greater consternation, or indeed 
to what extent the two are distinguishable.  
Where more direct expressions of outrage against hill minorities are impolitic, 
resentment is often displaced onto certain members of dominant groups, who are 
portrayed as manipulating peoples who would otherwise be more docile into 
unreasonable actions. Thus Dhammanaat Foundation has attributed the reluctance of 
Hmong communities to be removed from the highlands to the incitements of 
biologically-illiterate domestic non-government organizations or academics or to 
foreign development agencies who, ignoring the greater national good, have promised 
the highland minorities that they will make the highlands a "paradise" for them.53 The 
tactic is familiar from a range of other 20th-century examples in which, for example, 
anti-racist movements in the Southern US are attacked as stemming from white, 
"nigger-loving outside agitators";54 state poverty programmes are assaulted as 
spawning feckless black "welfare queens" or freeloading immigrants; or feminists or 
aboriginal advocates are tagged as "sexist" or "racist" because they are seen to be 
demanding "special privileges" or an "uneven playing field" for women or 
aboriginals.  
The backlash which has resulted from the success of some Chom Thong Hmong in 
playing the state's own game of "development" and adopting new, permanent-field 
cash crops such as cabbages -- a success for which extension officials used to hold 
them up as a model to other ethnic communities -- constitutes an irony which is not 
lost on highland minority groups. "You can't win, no matter what you do," noted one 
local Hmong village head wryly as early as 1990.55 A further irony observed by many 
highlanders is that they are still accused of concealing illicit activities even though, 
with the expansion of state activity in the hills, their every move has long been under 
surveillance by local officials.  
Racial Oppression as a Dynamic Process 
For social and environmental activists committed to combating racial oppression, it is 
worth taking a careful look at the strategies which a few conservation organizations 
active on the Chom Thong issue have followed in mobilizing and remobilizing ethnic 
divisions in the service of "forest conservation" and centralization. Equally worthy of 
analysis is the success of Dhammanaat Foundation in particular in attracting support 
from Western greens who profess surprise and disbelief at the charges of racism 
which have been levelled against the organization. Both phenomena reaffirm the 
importance of studying racial oppression as a dynamic process rather than as flowing 
merely from a preconceived theory, a set of fixed tactics, or a cluster of primordial 
prejudices. Especially notable is the flexibility certain conservation organizations 
display in using whatever resources are available in their efforts to divide ethnic 
groups from each other, both in practice and in theory, along the lines of an ethnic 
management grid whose shape and dimensions the organizations themselves attempt 
to determine.  
Physical Exclusion 
First, attempts are made in a crude physical way to enforce exclusionary ethnic 
divisions between lowlanders and highlanders and between highlanders and "Nature". 
In 1985, for example, Dhammanaat Foundation set up an 18-kilometre, ten-strand 
barbed wire fence around the mountain ridges in the area of Paa Kluay village. 
Erected to prevent Hmong villagers from destroying forest, it blocked them from 
entering their fallow land, 150-odd hectares of rice swidden and cabbage cultivation 
areas, and from carrying out fire-prevention and other forest-protection activities. The 
fence, which violated the National Forest Reserve Law, was protested by the governor 
of Chiang Mai province, but to no avail.56 Some 27 Hmong people were rendered 
landless and rice shortages affected the village.57 Similarly, Hmong communities have 
been largely excluded from forest management planning for the Mae Soi valley; their 
participation is seen as properly restricted to falling in with resettlement plans.58  
Conceptual Exclusion from "the Nation" 
At the level of language, highlanders have often been set apart from lowlanders by an 
apocalyptic, nationalist turn of phrase of a kind which has also been used in the racist 
and volkish discourse of the New Right in Europe -- one which tends to fuse concepts 
of race, nation, kin, blood and ethnic identity.59 In this discourse, the moral standing 
of highland minorities is undercut by identifying them as foreigners, hence justifying 
treating them as high-priority targets for action on ecological problems which have 
varied and complex origins. Thus, ignoring a history of logging, government 
extension, damaging lowland agricultural practices, increasing water consumption and 
climate change, phra Pongsak Techadhammo has warned his followers that a 
"calamitous drought is spreading across the whole country, withering the land 
because a small group of people have migrated into Thailand from neighbouring 
countries":  
"Should anyone insist that human rights take precedence over this law of nature, ... 
then these people must take responsibility for the destruction of the people of our 
nation, the land and the life of that land ... Which is the larger undertaking -- ensuring 
the survival of our land and our nation or the resettlement of the hilltribes?"60  
In an unconscious irony, a recent public rejoinder from Dhammanaat and allied 
conservationist groups to charges of racism proceeds once again to typecast highland 
minorities as foreigners to Thailand and as "people entering its land":  
"In contrast to their reception in neighbouring countries, they have been given a 
welcome. The tribal minorities from nearby countries have come to enjoy a life of 
relative peace and prosperity on Thailand's soils, benefiting from a high level of 
concern."61  
One recalls with difficulty that the Chom Thong villagers Dhammanaat is making 
special efforts to remove, including residents of Khun Klang and Paa Kluay villages, 
are Thai citizens, are from Thailand, and contribute to Thailand's economic, political 
and cultural life, boasting many forebears who have been long settled in the Chom 
Thong area. For Dhammanaat Foundation and its allies both in Thailand and abroad, 
as anthropologist Pinkaew Luangaramsri points out, "the Hmong" are always 
newcomers, the Other, migrants, nomads and refugees escaping from war and 
harassment, who, regardless of their actual history, legal status and style of life, must 
in principle be conceptualized as encountering inherent difficulties in conforming to 
Thai law and Thai hierarchy.62 It was consistent with this pattern when Dhammanaat 
erected another barbed-wire fence dividing mountain communities from "Nature" in 
June 1998 in Ob Luang National Park near Paa Kluay village, painting the fence posts 
in red, white and blue -- the colours of Thailand's national flag.63 The message was 
both unmistakable and provocative: those on one side of the fence belonged to the 
Thai "nation"; those on the other did not.  
Division of Minority Groups from Each Other 
By challenging the "ethnological" legitimacy of the many inter-ethnic alliances, 
movements and organizations which have emerged in Northern Thailand in the past 
decade, some conservationists also take it upon themselves to patrol what they see as 
the boundaries among different mountain-dwelling ethnic groups. For example, 
Dhammanaat Foundation has suggested that the Hmong ethnic group (which it 
regularly singles out as special ecological wrongdoers) do not have the standing to 
participate in the so-called "indigenous" organizations they have helped to form, since 
they are relatively recent arrivals in what is now Thailand and are thus not 
"indigenous". After an October 1998 meeting in London at which minority 
highlanders attempted to draw the attention of British Dhammanaat supporters to the 
dangers of the deepening divisions in Chom Thong, Dhammanaat invited the Hmong 
representative who spoke at the meeting for a chat, but not the Karen participant.64 
"You can just see the process of divide and rule," as Stuart Hall noted of 1970s 
Britain, when the Right, displaying a newfound appreciation of cultural diversity, 
began persistently calling attention to the separate ethnic origins of people of 
Caribbean, East African and Asian descent who had banded together in a self-
described Black movement.65  
Dissemination of Stereotypes 
Dhammanaat Foundation also attempts to convince outside observers and supporters 
of the rigidity of the ethnic boundaries and the mutual independence of the "ethnic" 
characteristics it designates. In discussions on forest conservation in Chom Thong, 
foundation spokespersons often begin with an ethnologically-informed taxonomy of 
the ethnic groups of the district and an objectification of some of the behaviours 
which distinguish them from one another. Hmong, for example, are typically 
stereotyped as "opium-growing peoples" with an associated proclivity for forest-
destructive activities in "undisturbed" forests above 1,000 metres in altitude.66 This 
approach tends to preempt consideration both of historical contingency (for instance, 
the previous integration of lowland and highland interests in the opium economy and 
the promotion of commercial cabbage cultivation by the state and foreign agencies) 
and of the agency of each group and its adaptability to changing circumstances. It 
hides, for example, the fact that it has become "misleading", as anthropologist Anan 
Ganjanapan puts it, "to associate any particular swidden practice rigidly with any 
particular ethnic group";67 that in adapting to national park encroachment on their 
land by taking up permanent-field agriculture, great numbers of highland villagers are 
pushed into raising the very commercial crops they are then stigmatized for growing; 
that some highland villagers are responding to environmental concerns and political 
necessity by switching to settled integrated farming;68 that the Hmong communities of 
Paa Kluay and Khun Klang have actually worked to cut their cultivated area since the 
end of the opium era; that neither village plants opium, which is now illegal;69 and 
that non-Hmong villages have been established above 1,000 metres.70  
Above all, the stereotyping strategy functions to short-circuit efforts at collective 
thinking about mutual highland-lowland adjustment, instead inviting outsiders to lend 
their support to a simplified, managerial, scapegoating approach to groups whose 
behaviour is regarded as fixed and unself-correcting. The strategy is buttressed by 
interpreting the utterances of others as if they, too, were necessarily organized around 
the logic of stereotype and fixed essences. Thus Dhammanaat has often attempted to 
portray its Western critics as holding the absurd view that mountain peoples in Chom 
Thong are "innocent ethnic peoples practising their timeless traditions", "living in 
ecological harmony, frozen in the mould of the past".71  
This stereotyping strategy has the additional advantage that it need not rely on 
discredited notions of biological or "natural" superiority. These are in any case less 
familiar in South-East Asia, where ethnic differentiation relies less on distinguishing 
cultural, phenotypical, biological, social and linguistic classifications than in Europe 
or North America. To borrow anthropologist Susan Wright's description of the New 
Right, this approach can easily adapt itself to the "anthropological idea that nations 
and cultures are historically constituted", yet use this idea "not to erode but to 
reinforce exclusiveness".72  
Guerrilla Speech Acts 
Cultural essentialism, too, can be discarded if it is ineffective in dividing and 
managing subordinate groups, in blocking paths of inquiry into the deeper causes of 
environmental crisis, or in supplying a useful straw for disenfranchised groups to 
grasp at. Thus, when pushed to retract its cultural essentialist claims, Dhammanaat 
has continued to defend targeting "the Hmong" for causing environmental crisis on 
the ground that it is simply more convenient to do so for popular audiences than to try 
to tease out all the complicated causal chains involved.73  
Other fallbacks are also available. For example, when stereotypes are challenged, it is 
possible to switch to the subtler rhetorical strategy of merely attaching an "ethnic" 
predicate to a noun in a way which suggests (without stating) that the attribute 
identified by the predicate is the cause of the purported problem identified by the 
noun. Thus the phrase "Hmong cabbages" is used nearly as frequently by some 
conservationists active in Chom Thong as "black family breakdown" is by the US 
Right, "Jewish bankers" by 1930s European anti-Semites, or "African corruption" by 
development agencies and right-wing political scientists.74 Eschewing the use of the 
lumbering armoured division of a single, well-articulated racial theory or stereotype in 
favour of the deployment of a mobile swarm of fleeting, evasive guerrilla speech acts, 
this strategy is well-adapted to escape damaging hits from the big guns of intellectual 
analysis. Camouflaged as common sense, carelessness or trivia, such utterances tend 
to melt into the underbrush when challenged. Rationalists drawn into hot pursuit are 
likely to be ambushed by protestations of "but do you deny that Hmong plant 
cabbages?" or accusations of "political correctness".  
The Transformation of Inclusion into Exclusion 
Racial oppression can and must also seek fresh resources in the very concepts which 
oppressed groups themselves use to seek legitimacy. Thus just as minority highlander 
groups interpret the double-edged categories "nation", "Thainess" and "development" 
in ways which make them as inclusive as possible, so Dhammanaat Foundation 
reinterprets the newly-valorized, double-edged category "indigenous" -- which has 
been constructed partly to help link together, and mobilize international support for, 
groups organized in less-hierarchical polities on the periphery of nation-states -- in 
ways which support exclusion. Taking advantage of tendencies within indigenous 
peoples' movements, including those of Thailand, to yoke the legitimacy of some of 
their claims to narrowly technical chronological priority of occupation or ancestral 
ties to particular land areas, Dhammanaat has been able to argue that certain minority 
groups in Northern Thailand enjoy neither.75  
The contest for the conceptual resources used to justify racial violence is not just a 
matter of word games -- or, as Quentin Tarantino puts it, what people talk about 
"before they get their guns out". It is also a part of the violent actions themselves. 
When Chom Thong conservationists and officials seized the highland village's 
Buddha images in March 1998, they were not merely attacking a minority 
community. They were also contesting what they saw as an attempt to appropriate the 
mantle of Buddhist legitimacy for an illicit settlement. Yet this act too, because it was 
an affront to the sacred, was double-edged in its potential to provoke feelings of 
repugnance among local residents, both highland and lowland.  
The Social Nature of Science 
Playing an especially important role in the dynamics of racial oppression in Chom 
Thong has been science -- not only anthropology and other "sciences of culture", but 
also hydrology, botany, ecology and other "sciences of nature". Like their social-
science counterparts, these disciplines are inevitably encased in the politics of their 
time. All derive many of their variables and questions, to say nothing of their 
directions and funding, from wider contemporary social currents.76 This is not an 
"impurity" in the natural sciences but one of their virtues: part of their strength as 
living, valuable, productive social practices capable of playing a role in human 
liberation is that they will always also be vulnerable to having their characters partly 
determined by, and to being drafted into a role which shores up, darker, anti-
democratic social trends. One of the darkest of these trends is that of ethnic 
divisiveness. In Thailand, as in India, Algeria and North America, the interface 
between actually-existing forest science and racial oppression is especially long and 
rich in capillary connections.77  
These connections are as productive in "good" science -- that science which yields 
true results -- as in what is referred to in the US legal system as "junk science". Junk 
science, of course, abounds in racist nature conservation in Northern Thailand, as it 
does elsewhere,78 and is the type of science usually targeted for criticism by anti-
racists. Examples include Dhammanaat Foundation's categorical claims that before 
Hmong occupation headwater forests were "undisturbed" or "pristine" and that 
lowland forests made no significant contribution to stream flow in river valleys and 
plains -- claims which are either contradicted by the available evidence or 
insufficiently substantiated.79 Evidence that extension of upland agriculture as 
practiced to date in Northern Thailand has resulted in increased erosion remains 
unconvincing,80 as does the claim that mere residence by humans in some parts of the 
highlands necessarily affects water supplies in the lowlands. As geographer Timothy 
Forsyth concludes, "the current perception of upland agriculture as damaging seems 
more reflective of historic Tai attitudes toward ethnic minorities than of an approach 
based on scientific research of environmental processes".81 Also unproven, even 
uninvestigated, is the blanket claim that only in the lowlands can "humankind exist 
with the forests". Nor has much scientific evidence been provided that monopoly 
bureaucratic control of highland forests would result in their preservation; indeed, 
most of the evidence is on the other side.  
Yet it is important to recall that "good" natural science -- that which is competent in 
conventional professional terms and which yields true results -- can also be shaped by, 
and shape in its turn, racial oppression. Political interests necessarily influence not 
only the social processes by which certain facts are highlighted above others, but also 
the processes by which certain questions are chosen over others for investigation; by 
which greater efforts are made to confirm one hypothesis rather than another; and by 
which scientific facts themselves are engendered and developed.82 Where the 
scientific gaze falls at a particular time, and what subsequently do and do not become 
solid, visible "facts", are partly determined by, among other political factors, 
background patterns of racial discrimination.  
Thus highland forests which have become a focus of urban middle-class 
contemplation, enjoyment and concern over water supplies will likely attract more 
scientific research than lowland forests which have already been cut or depleted. A 
political atmosphere dominated by the needs of institutions to make highland 
minorities the "usual suspects" for deforestation, similarly, will be more conducive to 
scientific findings being generated about the ecological drawbacks of highland 
cabbage cultivation, or of swidden agriculture, than about, say, lowland water 
consumption, the hydrological capacity of the Ping river basin as a whole, the record 
of Forest Department conservation, or defences against fire, mining and illegal 
logging which depend on highland communities staying in place. The net result is 
likely to be a science which, though it may escape the fate of "junk science", will 
accentuate the dichotomy between "sensitive" highland forests and "expendable" 
lowland forests. This is a science which, whatever its virtues, will do nothing to 
challenge what Anan Ganjanapan calls policy-makers' and government officials' 
"misconceptions about the management of the environment",83 including the notion 
that permanent agriculture is the only environmentally acceptable agriculture and that 
highland deforestation and lowland water shortages are caused by highland 
communities having been "established in the wrong place" and by their "unchecked 
growth of population".84  
The racist character and functions of such science -- again, assuming that it produces 
at least some confirmable, true and interesting findings -- cannot be explained away as 
unprofes-sionalism, bad intentions, irrationality or personal bias on the part of 
individual scientists. On the contrary: current professionalism dictates precisely that 
scientists not be distracted in their day-to-day work by questions about the origin or 
wider meaning of their investigations of, say, runoff from a particular field or species 
diversity in a forest fallow.  
The case is analogous to that of the 19th-century European scientists who, inspired to 
seek clues about what they were encouraged to see as "criminality", studied with great 
professionalism the skulls, cranial capacities and facial measurements of convicts;85 
or who, following their age's fascination with setting up oppositions between the 
sexual nature and practices of Africans and Europeans, formed themselves into a 
committee to examine, describe and formulate theories about the labia of Sarah 
Bartmann, the "Hottentot Venus", whose genitals, after her death, were painstakingly 
dissected, measured, analyzed, detached, and displayed.86 The case is also analogous 
to that of 20th century scientists who compile gene sequences or IQ statistics as part 
of inquiries into urban violence, homelessness or divorce. All such scientists can 
legitimately attest that they are merely "reading off" what the calipers, rulers and test 
results say, merely stating "the way the world is". If in so doing they are contributing 
to the naturalization of current discriminatory boundaries, they can protest, that is 
only because the facts compel them to do so. What procedures these facts emerge 
from, what other facts they obscure, and what role they play in the economy of 
racism, is irrelevant to the question of whether they are facts or not, which is the only 
"scientific" question which can be raised about them.  
This characteristic protest, to give it the benefit of the doubt, may often be merely 
naive. Many scientists' consciousness of the ways they are contributing to racism are 
likely to be buried beneath moral fervour and excitement at the prospect of bringing 
their own expertise usefully to bear on a social problem.87 Then too, just as plumbers 
are likely to suspect that many social problems are the result of deficient pipes, or 
teachers to suggest that a lack of classrooms might be responsible, so many natural 
scientists are likely to have little difficulty in convincing themselves that what is 
mainly lacking in society is proper scientific knowledge. But perhaps the biggest 
encouragement of all to many scientists' sense of their own innocence and privileged 
moral status is a still-popular view according to which natural science, alone among 
human endeavours (with the possible lingering exception of religion), is capable of 
escaping, in the words of biologist and historian Donna Haraway, the "processes 
which give it birth", deriving neither inspiration nor direction nor authority, questions, 
methods, theories and facts from social sources, but entirely from a purified Natural 
and non-racialized Other which reveals itself in due course to a properly-sensitized 
priesthood through the oracles of instruments, observations, textbooks, and the 
"scientific method" itself.88 From this perspective, for scientists to take responsibility 
for asking questions about those structures of racial oppression in their societies 
which might play a part in constructing their topics, theories, laboratories, field sites, 
statistical methods and refereed scientific papers is as uncalled-for as it would be for 
characters in a Greek drama to ask if there might be some human involvement in all 
those cryptic messages emanating from Delphi. Hence the puzzled complaint of 
scientific nature conservationists such as those associated with Dhammanaat 
Foundation, whenever the issue of racial oppression is brought up, that:  
"[i]t serves no useful purpose to bring the issue of racism into what is essentially a 
discussion about how to manage people and natural resources for sustainable 
development in fragile ecosystems".89  
The presumption throughout is of a scientific terrain which is somehow devoid of 
racism, and indeed of politics altogether, until they are (illegitimately) introduced.90  
Denying Racism, Obeying "Natural Law" 
The example suggests why the close study of science as a social practice is 
indispensable to contemporary anti-racist struggles. The less necessary it seems to 
scientists to examine their work for the marks of racial oppression, the more potent 
and resilient that oppression is likely to be. The view that natural science is, in 
principle, an activity in which (in philosopher Bernard Williams's phrase) a Nature 
purified of human activity "inscribes itself into scientific journals without benefit of 
human intervention" is one aspect of that denial of the extent of racism which is an 
integral part of contemporary racial oppression. Conversely, if science were better 
appreciated as a living social process performed by human beings -- and not seen as 
one that derives its authority from a metaphysical connection with a purified "natural" 
realm walled off from political processes -- the more that its best products (as well as 
its worst) would themselves be seen as being based partly on political choice. The 
result would be less temptation to be seduced by the dangerous vision of a "science-
based" or "science-led" policy whose science is not also at the same time policy-
based.  
To question the oracular, priestly view of natural science is politically important also 
in that it gets at the heart of the puzzle of why racist nature conservationism can 
appeal so strongly to many Western environmentalists who, in other spheres of life, 
are not insensitive to the lessons of the struggle against Naziism, oppression of blacks, 
and so forth. To say, as Dhammanaat Foundation does, that environmental problems 
in Chom Thong are a result of lack of scientific education among most of those 
concerned is acceptable, comfortably familiar, even flattering, to educated, middle-
class Westerners, whereas a more openly and conventionally racist explanation would 
not be.  
In Thailand itself, the oracular view of science has been strengthened by its fusion 
with intellectualistic strains of modern Buddhist thought which locate the roots of 
social and environmental problems in a lack of "correct understanding" of an 
unchanging and unquestionable "Nature" which dictates the form a moral and 
"correct" society must take.91 One late abbot revered by the progressive middle class, 
and said to be an influence on phra Pongsak Techadhammo, saw this society as 
realizable only through a "Buddhist socialist democracy which is guided by dhamma 
and managed by a 'dictator' whose character [charisma] exemplifies the ten Royal 
Virtues (dasarajadhamma)".92 This dictator, of a non-hereditary ksatriya93 class, 
would be necessary to "expedite" the society's achievement of an "original state of 
nature or human condition" -- one without multiplying, unsatisfiable material desires 
and without accumulation, in which the needs of society as a whole superseded those 
of individuals.  
Such views, which enjoy huge moral authority, can easily be enlisted to lend weight 
to the view that once all parties are imbued by aristocratic, scientific or priestly elites 
with a correct understanding of hydrological principles, resettlement of minority 
groups will follow as a matter of course.94 Sermons against "desires that cannot be 
satisfied" can meanwhile be selectively directed against highland minorities who, 
supposedly unlike the lowland majority, have "destroyed forests not to support human 
life but for riches, for financial gain".95 The result is a potent anti-democratic mixture 
which carries more than a faint echo of the "natural law" rhetoric of German National 
Socialism, according to which an "ideologically charged 'natural order'" held to be 
unmediated by the social and political "does not leave room for compromise; its 
claims are absolute".96 According to phra Pongsak Techadhammo, forest 
conservation:  
"is not a matter of differing personal opinions. It is a matter of truth and lie, a matter 
of upholding the truth or destroying and ignoring the laws of nature ... The blood in 
our veins and the water in the highland streams are connected. When the forests are 
felled and the balance of nature is destroyed, the life capacity of the earth diminishes. 
It is not within our power to stop this. We cannot change a law of nature".97  
"If those who are destroying [forests] ... would leave the area, our problems would be 
solved," phra Pongsak concludes. "Let us have no more talk".  
Explaining Away Resistance 
Thais who believe that, on the contrary, it would be constructive, both from a 
scientific and from a policy point of view, to have quite a bit more talk, especially 
from oppressed groups in Chom Thong who have not yet had much chance to be 
heard on the national stage, are meanwhile not only contesting the terrain of Buddhist 
morality but also tapping popular democratic and anti-discriminatory currents of 
feeling. These currents are formidable. These days, talk of "participation" is 
everywhere in the air in rural Thailand, while in most national and international 
forums, it is no longer politic to profess racist views publicly. Under public pressure, 
even the highly-authoritarian World Bank has been compelled, in its writings if not in 
its other practices, to take a stand against forced resettlement.  
Conservation organizations demanding removal of mountain peoples from the 
highlands have thus had no choice, when on the public and especially the international 
stage, but to disavow violence, forced resettlement and racism. This has led to 
considerable -- and potentially productive -- strain. First, denying racism has entailed 
an awkward attempt to erase a great deal of recent Thai history and to mould racism 
into (to use Stuart Hall's words) "respectable forms which exempt it from having to 
recognize itself as such".98 Second, in the face of ethnic minorities' massive and 
longstanding resistance to resettlement,99 and thus the certainty that in many cases 
relocation would have to be forced,100 conservation organizations have been able to 
maintain their position advocating segregation of highlanders from "sensitive" forests 
only by attempting to simulate democratic consent to removal. Thus the headline in a 
1997 English-language Dhammanaat newsletter aimed at an international audience 
trumpeted that "The Hmong want to come down!",101 while foundation spokesperson 
mom rachawong Smansanid has claimed when talking to Europeans that "all the 
hilltribes I've met want to come down".102  
The fact that minority groups contest such claims has made some awkward 
manoeuvres necessary. For example, a Thai-language petition referred to by British 
Dhammanaat supporters at a meeting in London in 1998 purporting to be signed by 
minority villagers agreeing to relocation turned out, on examination by the Thai 
speakers present, to be from landless villagers from a district outside Chom Thong 
who were requesting land. Confronted with the fact that the ethnic minority leaders 
present also clearly indicated their opposition to relocation, one Dhammanaat 
supporter was reduced to pointing to a photograph of a politely-smiling Hmong 
village leader visiting the resettlement site being prepared by the foundation as 
evidence of minority acquiescence in relocation.103 This prompted a Thai observer to 
joke privately that "it looks like we'll have to warn our friends not to smile in any 
picture taken by Dhammanaat for fear it will be misinterpreted." On the ground in 
Chom Thong itself, the need to be seen to be involving minority groups in 
resettlement plans has resulted in a minority presence at some meetings. However, the 
facts that the language of such meetings is Thai, with which many mountain groups 
are uncomfortable, and that an atmosphere of intimidation and implicit threat toward 
minorities often prevails, make it difficult to regard this as a step toward 
democracy.104  
Environmental Racism as International 
Throughout their existence, campaigns to dispossess hill-dwelling minorities in 
Thailand have tapped the power of international racist science and development 
discourse. Organizations such as Dhammanaat Foundation, in addition, have attracted 
significant international support, both material and moral, from liberal Western 
environmentalists, who, in addition to sometimes having little understanding of the 
historical dynamics of race in Thailand, often seem noticeably forgetful of the West's 
own lessons of racist violence and racist denial. Indeed, as Dhammanaat itself points 
out, phra Pongsak Techadhammo's "ideas have been more quickly appreciated in the 
international community" than among Thais.105  
Thus a brochure issued by the Dhammanaat Foundation contains warm endorsements 
from leading British green Jonathon Porritt, film director David Puttnam, and wildlife 
documentary presenter David Attenborough,106 who said in a recent interview on the 
Chom Thong issue that he did not have time to discuss indigenous peoples.107 
Appreciative documentaries treating the foundation's activities have been aired in 
Australia, Sweden and the UK.108 The foundation, which is a registered charity in the 
UK, lists financial donations from the Canadian Friends Service Committee, the 
British, German and Canadian Embassies in Thailand, the Canada Fund, the Ford 
Foundation, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), WWF-UK, the United Nations 
Environment Programme, the Thai-German Development Foundation, the Van Meile 
firm of The Netherlands and the Bristol Rainforest Group, as well as model Penelope 
Tree and the Prince of Wales.109  
Several British Dhammanaat supporters also unwittingly echo the more extreme racial 
language used by the foundation. Somerset Wildlife Trust Director Roger Martin, an 
ex-diplomat, for example, singles out "Hmong cabbages" as a cause of deforestation 
in Chom Thong in a recent letter to the World Rainforest Movement supporting 
Dhammanaat's approach.110 By collapsing a multifaceted ecological history and 
politics into a single ethnic predicate, such epithets help clear the ground for the 
construction, in the West as well as in Thailand, of practical syllogisms of a chillingly 
familiar type: cabbages cause deforestation; the cabbages are Hmong; therefore take 
away the Hmong. While few Western environmentalists would today permit 
themselves to indulge in a phrase such as (for example) "Jewish cabbages", or claim 
that the damaging ecological effects of (say) "Black sugar cane" grown in Haiti or 
"German battery acid" produced in a Rhineland factory implies that plantation land 
should be taken over by whites, or German industries by North Americans, it is worth 
noting that, among the more backward elements of international nature 
conservationism, "forest cleansing" remains more acceptable than "ethnic cleansing" 
of the more familiar variety.  
Understanding environmental racism means paying attention both to the uniqueness 
of particular cases and to wider parallels. Examples such as that of Chom Thong 
provide rich materials for understanding evolving patterns of ethnic violence and their 
links both to local and regional inter-class politics and resource competition and to 
structures of racism embedded in international science and mainstream 
environmentalism.  
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